Abstract-In this paper, we investigate optimal resource allocation in a power beacon-assisted wireless-powered communication network (PB-WPCN), which consists of a set of hybrid access point (AP)-source pairs and a power beacon (PB). Each source, which has no embedded power supply, first harvests energy from its associated AP and/or the PB in the downlink (DL) and then uses the harvested energy to transmit information to its AP in the uplink (UL). We consider both cooperative and noncooperative scenarios based on whether the PB is cooperative with the APs or not. For the cooperative scenario, we formulate a social welfare maximization problem to maximize the weighted sum-throughput of all AP-source pairs, which is subsequently solved by a water-filling based distributed algorithm. In the noncooperative scenario, all the APs and the PB are assumed to be rational and self-interested such that incentives from each AP are needed for the PB to provide wireless charging service. We then formulate an auction game and propose an auction based distributed algorithm by considering the PB as the auctioneer and the APs as the bidders. Finally, numerical results are performed to validate the convergence of both the proposed algorithms and demonstrate the impacts of various system parameters.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, wireless energy transfer (WET) technologies have drawn wide attention with their capability of energy supply [2] . Conventionally, the very limited energy of wireless devices powered by batteries largely constrains the communication performance in many practical cases such as wireless sensor networks [3] . Also, the battery replacement for wireless devices is not always convenient or feasible in many applications. These challenging issues have boosted the development of WET technologies, which enable wireless devices to harvest energy from wireless signals for their intended applications. As one category of existing WET techniques, the radio frequency (RF)-enabled WET [4] considered in this paper, provides the feasibility of a long-range energy transfer (up to tens of meters [5] Part of this work was presented at the IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), London, UK, June 2015 [1] .
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coupling [6] and magnetic resonance coupling [7] . RF-enabled WET has not been widely used in practice largely due to the high propagation loss of RF signals. However, due to the latest breakthroughs in wireless communications, namely small cells [8] , transmission using large-scale antenna arrays (i.e., massive MIMO) [9] , millimeter-wave communications [10] , the transmission distances would be dramatically reduced and sharp beamforming could be enabled, which will significantly reduce the propagation loss and achieve much higher WET efficiencies [5] . Furthermore, the energy consumption of users will be continuously reduced by the advancements in lowpower electronics [11] . Thus, we believe that the RF-enabled WET has a great potential to be widely implemented in the next-generation wireless communication systems. Then, by considering the RF-enabled WET technique, a fully wirelesspowered communication network (WPCN) can be established with no need of battery replacement [2] . In a WPCN, wireless devices are only powered by WET in the downlink (DL) and transmit their information using the harvested energy in the uplink (UL) [12] .
In open literature, there have been several papers that focused on the design of WPCNs for different setups [11] - [15] . In [12] , a "harvest-then-transmit" protocol was proposed for a multi-user WPCN, where users first harvest energy from RF signals broadcast by a single antenna hybrid access point (AP) in the DL and then transmit information to the AP in the UL via time division multiple access (TDMA). Moreover, the DL WET time from the AP and UL information transmission time of individual users were jointly optimized to maximize the system sum-throughput. [13] extended [12] to a multiantenna WPCN scenario, where a multi-antenna AP enables the simultaneous UL transmission via space division multiple access (SDMA). [14] and [15] considered full-duplex WPCNs, where a full-duplex AP is adopted to provide the simultaneous DL WET and UL information transmission. Moreover, [16] - [18] focused on the development of cooperative protocols for WPCNs with different setups. In all aforementioned papers, only AP is considered as the energy source of the whole network. In [11] , the authors proposed the idea of deploying dedicated power nodes, named power beacons (PBs), to enable WET in the DL. By resorting to the stochastic geometry theory, the densities and transmit power of PBs are investigated under data links' outage constraint. With this PB-based WET, we thus could consider a new network setup, named "PBassisted WPCN (PB-WPCN)", in which each user can harvest wireless energy not only from the AP but also from the deployed PB. For this new model, a natural question that arises is "how to optimally allocate the resources of PB-WPCNs, including the PBs' energy, and the time for DL WET as well as the UL information transmission?". To the best of our knowledge, this is still an open question, which motivates this paper.
In this paper, we consider a PB-WPCN consisting of one multi-antenna PB and multiple single-antenna AP-source pairs. In view of the state of art and trend of RF energy transfer [4] , the considered network setup is very likely to find its applications in the practical scenario of small cells, such as picocells (range from 10 to 100 meters) and femtocells (WiFilike range), which has been regarded as one of the key enabling technologies of the upcoming 5G cellular networks [8] . It is also worth mentioning that although introducing the PB may result in some extra cost and complexity to the system, this could be beneficial as a whole based on the following considerations: (1) The PB could be dedicated designed for WET only and thus can achieve a higher WET efficiency by exploiting the benefits of energy beamforming enabled by multiple antennas [19] , [20] . (2) The deployment of the PB could be more flexible since it has much looser backhaul requirement. (3) By using both the AP and PB to perform WET simultaneously, the transmit diversity could be achieved and thus could make the RF energy harvesting at the user side more robust. We consider that the APs and the PB are connected to constant power supplies. Each AP aims to collect the information from its associated source. It is assumed that each source has no embedded energy supply but has the ability to harvest and store the energy from RF signals broadcast by its AP and/or the PB. The PB is installed to assist APs during the DL WET phase by providing wireless charging service. Note that the energy allocation of the PB and time allocation of each AP-source pair are tangled together. This makes the distributed and optimal resource allocation for the considered PB-WPCN non-trivial at all. The main contributions of this paper are two-fold.
Firstly, we consider a cooperative scenario, where all the AP-source pairs and the PB are cooperative to maximize the network social welfare, which is defined as the weighted sumthroughput of all AP-source pairs. This is done by jointly optimizing the DL WET time of each AP and the energy allocation of the PB. A water-filling based algorithm is subsequently proposed to optimally solve the formulated social welfare maximization problem in a distributed manner. Note that this cooperative scenario can correspond to the situation that APs and the PB are deployed by the same operator, as the one considered in [11] .
Secondly, we consider a non-cooperative scenario, where all the APs and the PB are assumed to be rational and selfinterested. This scenario could be used to model the case that the APs and the PB are installed by different operators. The PB will ask a monetary payment on its wireless charging service and the APs will measure its benefits obtained from the achievable throughput with its payment to the PB. The conflicting interactions among the APs and the PB can be modeled by game theory. Specifically, we formulate an auction game for this non-cooperative scenario based on the wellknown Ausubel auction [21] , which induces truthful bidding and achieves the maximum social welfare [21] - [24] . In this formulated game, the APs are bidders and the PB is the seller as well as the auctioneer. An auction based distributed algorithm is proposed to analyze the formulated game and its convergence is subsequently proved. Note that auction theory [22] has been well investigated and widely applied for designing the resource allocation in cognitive radio networks [25] , D2D communication networks [26] , cooperative communication networks [27] as well as energy harvesting networks [28] , [29] . A cooperative network with multiple source-destination pairs and a relay was considered in [28] , where an auction based power allocation scheme was proposed to allocate the harvested energy of the relay in a distributed manner. [29] formulated a non-cooperative game to model the competitive WET bidding of the users in a WPCN with one AP and multiple users, where the AP adopted auction mechanism for DL WET. Both [28] and [29] adopted the concept of Nash equilibrium to evaluate the strategic interactions between bidders only. In contrast, in this paper we adopt a different auction mechanism to study the hierarchal interaction between the PB (auctioneer) and the AP-source pairs (bidders). The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first elaborate the system model in Section II. Then, a social welfare maximization problem for the cooperative scenario is formulated and a water-filling based distributed algorithm is proposed in Section III. In section IV, an auction game for the non-cooperative scenario is designed and an auction based distributed algorithm is proposed. Section V presents the numerical results. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, as shown in Fig. 1 , we consider a PB-WPCN with one PB and N APs associated with N (information) sources. Each AP aims to collect the information from its associated source. We denote by N = {1, · · · , N } the set of AP-source pairs and the ith AP-source pair consists of the ith AP and the ith (associated) source, ∀i ∈ N . We consider that each source has no fixed energy supplies and thus needs to replenish energy from the signal 1 sent by its AP and/or the PB. The APs and the PB are connected to constant power supplies. We also consider that all APs are connected with the PB via backhaul but they are not connected with each other directly. We assume that all the AP-source pairs work on orthogonal frequency bands, while the PB can work on all frequency bands. All AP-source pairs work in the half-duplex mode. The APs and sources are each equipped with one single antenna and the PB is equipped with M > 1 antennas. Full channel state information (CSI) is assumed to be available at the transmitter side.
We exploit the "harvest-then-transmit" protocol proposed in [12] . Specifically, each source first harvests energy from RF signals broadcast by its associated AP and/or the PB in the DL and then uses the harvested energy for information transmission in the UL. By considering that the sources may be low-cost, low-complexity and low-energy devices, we assume that an integrated architecture is adopted at each source, where the energy harvesting component and the information processing component are integrated together by using one rectifier circuit [31] . In this context, each source can only harvest energy from the RF signals with the frequency inside its working band 2 , which means that each source can only harvest energy from its own AP and/or the PB.
As illustrated in Fig. 2 , we assume that all APs and PB perform WET to sources simultaneously from the beginning of each transmission block T . We denote by τ i the fraction of a transmission block T for DL WET from the ith AP to the ith source, and we denote by τ i the fraction for DL WET from the PB to the ith source. Then the DL WET time for the ith source is thus given by max (τ i , τ i ) T . During the remaining time (1 − max (τ i , τ i )) T , the ith source uses the harvested energy to transmit its information to its corresponding AP in the UL. For convenience and without loss of generality, we assume that T = 1 in the sequel of this paper.
We assume that the DL and UL channels are reciprocal. Let scalar g i denote the complex channel between the ith AP and the ith source and let k i ∈ C M ×1 denote the complex channel vector between the PB and the ith source, where C M ×1 denotes a set of all complex vectors of size M × 1. Besides, we use w i ∈ C M ×1 to denote the beamforming vector at the PB applied to the energy signal transmitted to the ith source with w i 2 = 1, where w i is the Euclidean norm of w i . It is assumed that the ith AP transmits with power p i to the ith source and the PB transmits to each 1 Note that the energy signal could be designed as a zero-mean pseudorandom signal with arbitrary distribution as long as its power spectral density satisfies certain regulations on radio signal radiation for the operating band of interest since it does not carry any intentional information [30] . 2 Note that if the sources are advanced enough such that they are equipped with separated front-end hardware for the energy harvesting unit and the information processing unit, it is also interesting to consider the case that the RF energy transfer is performed in a wideband manner and the sources can harvest energy over all frequency bands. However, the design of such a system with wideband energy transfer would be quite different from and much more complicated than the considered one with narrowband energy transfer. Thus, as the initial effort towards the design of the PB-WPCN, we choose to focus on the case with narrowband energy transfer in this paper and we would like to consider the design of another interesting setup with wideband energy transfer as our future work. source on different frequency bands 3 with the same power p b . Furthermore, the PB is constrained by a total energy during each transmission block, denoted by E tot b , which leads to a total energy constraint
Then, during the DL WET phase, the received signal at the ith source, denoted by y i , can be expressed as follows when both the ith AP and the PB perform WET to the ith source,
where x i,AP and x i,P B are the transmitted signals from the ith AP and the PB to the ith source, respectively, with
H is the Hermitian transpose. n i is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with a zero mean and variance σ 2 . Note that the first or the second term on the right-hand side of (1) should be removed when only the PB or the ith AP transfers energy to the ith source.
Since the multi-antenna PB transmits energy signal to a single-antenna source and full CSI is available at the PB, the optimal energy beamforming vector at the PB should be maximum ratio transmission (MRT) [20] , [32] . We thus have w i = ki ki . Therefore, at the end of WET phase, the amount of energy harvested by the ith source, denoted by E s i , can be written by
where 0 < η < 1 is the energy conversion efficiency, G i |g i | 2 is the channel power gain between the ith AP and the ith source, K i k i 2 is the equivalent channel power gain between the PB and the ith source, and the harvested energy from the noise is ignored since it is negligible in practice [31] . We also define that
H , respectively. Note that the derivation from (1) 3 Multi-input single-output and orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (MISO-OFDM) can be adopted at the PB to power the sources on different frequency bands via multiple antennas. 4 Generally, an energy consumption constraint should also be imposed to each AP as that to the PB. But, the energy consumption requirement at the APs could be easily satisfied because we consider that the APs are connected to constant power supplies and only serve their own source with fixed transmit power. In contrast, the PB needs to transmit wireless energy to multiple sources and its energy consumption constraint could be frequently violated when the number of sources becomes large. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the proposed distributed algorithm elaborated in Section III can readily be extended to solve the problem with additional energy constraints for the APs. For the purpose of exposition, in this paper we choose to ignore the energy constraint at each AP.
to (2) is carried out based on the assumption that the signals transmitted by the AP and PB are mutually independent as in [28] , [33] , [34] .
After the source replenishes its energy in the DL, it then transmits its information to the AP in the UL. It is assumed that the harvested energy is exhausted by the source for information transmission. The effect of energy storage and energy consumption of the circuit is disregarded for clarity as in [12] , [13] . The transmit power of the ith source, denoted by q i , is thus equal to
Then, the achievable throughput at the ith AP can be written as
where W is the bandwidth and σ 2 is the noise power, which are assumed to be the same for all AP-source pairs, without loss of generality. It can be observed from (4) that the achievable throughput for the ith source to its AP can be increased with the assistance of the PB.
In this paper, we consider both cooperative and noncooperative scenarios based on whether the PB is cooperative with the APs or not. In the cooperative scenario, the PB and the APs cooperate to maximize the network social welfare, defined as the weighted sum-throughput of all AP-source pairs. In contrast, the PB and the APs are considered to be selfinterested in the non-cooperative scenario. More specifically, the PB will ask a monetary compensation for its wireless charging service and each AP-source pair will value its benefits with its payment to the PBs. We will design the resource allocation schemes for these two scenarios in the following sections, respectively.
III. COOPERATIVE SCENARIO
In this section, we first formulate a social welfare maximization problem for the cooperative scenario and then solve it with a water-filling based algorithm in a distributed manner.
A. Problem Formulation
We consider a weight λ i > 0 for the ith AP, which represents a gain per unit throughput from the ith source to its AP. Then, the social welfare maximization problem can be formulated as
where the constraint 0 < max (τ i , τ i ) < 1 guarantees that the weighted sum-throughput is larger than zero. By observing the objective function of problem (5), we obtain the following lemma:
where E i τ i p b is the amount of energy that the PB allocates to the ith source.
Proof : We first prove that max{τ i , τ i } = τ i by contradiction. If τ i < τ i , then max{τ i , τ i } = τ i and (4) becomes
We can easily see that the right-hand side of (7) is a monotonically increasing function of τ i . This means that the achievable throughput R i can always be enhanced by increasing the value of τ i to that of τ i . This contradicts the assumption that τ i < τ i . We thus have τ i ≥ τ i , i.e., max{τ i , τ i } = τ i . Furthermore, for the ease of presentation, we define that E i τ i p b , which is the amount of energy that the PB allocates to the ith source. Applying these two operations into (4), we can rewrite it as (6), which completes this proof.
Based on Lemma 1, we can reformulate the problem (5) as
where
T , the symbols ≺ and represent the element-wise inequality, 0 or 1 is a vector of zeros or ones that has the same size as τ and E, and the constraint of E is derived based on E i = τ i p b and 0 ≤ τ i ≤ τ i . Moreover, we denote by (τ * , E * ) the optimal solution to the problem (8) .
We can see from (8) that the social welfare can only be maximized by jointly designing the DL WET time of each AP and the energy allocation of the PB. It is worth noting that τ and E are mutually interdependent and the achievable throughput of all APs are coupled together due to the total energy constraint i∈N E i ≤ E tot b .
B. Optimal Solution and Distributed Algorithm
The convexity of the objective function in problem (8) can readily be checked by introducing a new optimization variable θ i = 1 − max{τ i , τ i }, ∀i ∈ N . Substituting θ i into (4), we can observe that R i (τ i , τ i ) is jointly concave on τ i , τ i and θ i , since θ i is the perspective variable of the log. Accordingly, the problem (8) is convex and could be solved by applying standard convex optimization approaches. However, these approaches are normally done in a centralized manner. In practice, a distributed approach is of more interest because it can significantly reduce the network overhead. Motivated by this, we propose a distributed method with three steps to resolve it in this section. In step 1, we first find the optimal relationship between τ i and E i by expressing τ i as a function of E i . Then, the problem (8) can be reformulated as a problem with only E as a variable. In step 2, we investigate the properties of the reformulated problem. Finally, a water-filling based algorithm is proposed to find the optimal solution of the new problem in step 3. We describe the details of these three steps in the following subsections. 1) Step 1. Problem Reformulation: We first derive the expression of τ i as a function of E i for each AP. With a given E that satisfies 0 E ≺ 1p b and i∈N E i ≤ E tot b , the problem (8) is decoupled and we can have the following optimization problem for each AP regarding τ i ,
where S i (τ i ) can be expressed by
We denote by τ i (E i ) the optimal solution of (9), which is given in the following proposition.
to the problem (9) can be expressed by
and z i † > 1 can be expressed by
in which W (x) is the Lambert W function that is the solution to the equality x = W exp(W).
Proof : See Appendix A. Then, by replacing τ i in S i (τ i ) with τ i (E i ) given in Proposition 1, we have a function S i (E i ) with only E i as the variable given by the following Lemma. Lemma 2. S i (E i ) can be expressed by
Proof : See Appendix B.
Hence, we now can reformulate the problem (8) with only E as the variable as follows
Note that we can solve the problem (15) to obtain E , and then we can calculate τ based on (11), thereby solving the original problem (8).
2)
Step 2. Property Characterization: To solve the problem (15), we first characterize the properties of the objective function i∈N S i (E i ). Since i∈N S i (E i ) is a positive summation of N independent functions with the same structure, we then first investigate the property of any function S i (E i ), which is summarized in the following proposition:
where α i is a constant given by
and β i (E i ) is strictly decreasing, which is expressed as
Proof : See Appendix B. Therefore, based on Proposition 2, it is easy to show that S i (E i ) is a concave function of E i when 0 ≤ E i < p b . Then, by letting the first-order derivative of S i (E i ) be equal to zero, i.e., β i (E i ) = 0, we obtain the stationary point that maximizes
where z ‡ i > 1 can be expressed as
Note that E o i has the same structure as E (11), (14) and (16), respectively, are graphically interpreted in Fig. 3 . We use the black and red curves to characterize the functions in the intervals 0 Fig. 3(a) 
is shown to be always negative.
3)
Step 3. A Distributed Algorithm: Based on the analysis in step 2, the optimization problem (15) can be written as
summarized in Proposition 3, we then can solve the problem (21) using a water-filling based approach [35] . It should be noted that when E tot b ≥ i∈N E o i , the optimization problem (21) has a trivial solution that E i = E o i , ∀i ∈ N . We thus only consider the case that E tot b
, namely, the PB's energy will be exhausted to enhance the social welfare. The optimal solution E to the problem (21) can be presented by the following proposition. 
T with
where ν ≥ 0 is a constant chosen to meet the total energy constraint i∈N E i = E tot b and γ i (ν) is a strictly decreasing function on 0 ≤ ν < α i given by
where z § i > 1 is the unique solution of the equation
Proof : See Appendix C. According to Proposition 3 and Proposition 4, there exists a unique ν to meet the total energy constraint. However, from Proposition 4, if ν = α i , then E i has a unique solution only under the assumption that each AP corresponds to a different α i , ∀i ∈ N . This is because E j , ∀j ∈ N \{i} is unique when ν = α j . If there is at least another AP, say the kth AP, k ∈ N \{i}, and ν = α k = α i , then the optimality can be achieved with multiple solutions. Based on the proof of Proposition 4, the solutions of E i and E k can be any combination, which is subject to that 0
Next, we propose a water-filling based distributed algorithm to obtain E by finding the constant ν. Note that we only consider the case that each AP corresponds to a different α i , which can be readily modified to adapt to the case that multiple APs have the same α i . For convenience and without loss of generality, we assume that α 1 > α 2 > · · · > α N . As ν is unique and ν ≥ 0, a possible value of ν could be α i , ∀i ∈ N , or between an interval (α i+1 , α i ), where α N +1 0. Note that when the optimal ν falls into an interval between any two adjacent α i 's, we need to apply the iterative water-filling algorithm [36] to achieve it. Specifically, after the PB releases the current energy price in each round, all the APs update their bids in parallel and feedback them to the PB within the current round.
We now elaborate the steps in Algorithm 1. Each AP first provides its α i to the PB, then the PB constructs a descending sequence {α i } i∈N , sets i = 1 and announces ν (i) , which is equal to each α i , sequentially. Then, with ν (i) , the jth AP, ∀j ∈ N \{i}, computes the response, here denoted by E (i) j , according to (22) , while 5 the ith AP responds that E
. Then, by comparing the aggregate of all the responses, computed by E
, with E tot b , the PB can decide the value of ν as listed in Algorithm 1. Note that if ν exists in an interval, then a bisection method [37] can be employed to find the unique value. The implementation of the bisection method is simple and thus omitted. It can be observed that Algorithm 1 can always find the exact value or the existing interval of ν with at most N iterations, since ν is unique and 0 ≤ ν ≤ max i∈N {α i }.
According to Algorithm 1, each AP first needs to measure the (equivalent) channel power gains G i and K i , and acquire the transmit power p b from the PB. The values calculated by each AP and forwarded to the PB should be α i given in (17), 5 According to Proposition 4, given ν = α i , the response energy for the ith AP is that E i = E tot b − j∈N \{i} E j . However, this happens only when ν is found to meet the total energy constraint. As proved in Appendix C, given ν = α i , under the assumption that the ith AP does not know the total energy constraint, the possible value of E i exists in an interval 0, E lim i . Therefore, in this case, the ith AP is set to respond that E (i) i = E lim i to the PB. Then the PB knows the interval of the ith AP, which will help it to make decisions in the following steps. Fig. 3 . Graphical interpretations for the functions (11), (14) and (16) in the proposed cooperative scenario.
Algorithm 1 Water-filling based Distributed Algorithm 1: Each AP reflects its α i to the PB. 2: The PB constructs a descending sequence {α i } i∈N , sets i = 1 and repeats:
1) The PB announces ν (i) = α i to all APs. 2) The jth AP responds an optimal E (i) j to the PB according to Proposition 4, ∀j ∈ N \{i}, while the ith AP responds E
3) The PB computes that E
and compares E 
j . c) Else, the unique ν ∈ (α i , α i−1 ), which can be readily found via a bisection method.
defined in (12) and the optimal response obtained by (22) . With these signals from the APs, the PB announces ν (i) i at the end of each iteration and the allocated energy E i at last to each AP.
Finally, with the value of ν achieved via Algorithm 1 and (22), we can obtain E . Subsequently, based on (11) given in Proposition 1, we have
T . Therefore, we have already found the optimal solution (τ , E ) of the original problem (8).
IV. NON-COOPERATIVE SCENARIO
This section investigates the non-cooperative scenario, where the multiple APs and the PB are assumed to be rational and self-interested. We adopt an auction model to characterize the conflicting interactions among the APs and the PB, where the APs are bidders and the PB is the auctioneer. In particular, we employ a well-known Ausubel auction [21] , which constructs an ascending-bid version of the VickreyClarke-Groves (VCG) auction and induces truthful bidding 6 as well as achieves the maximum social welfare, i.e., the global optimum [21] - [24] . In the sequel, we first define the utility functions of both APs and the PB. Then we formulate an auction game, in which an auction based distributed algorithm 6 Truthful bidding means that reporting true optimal demand at every iteration is a mutually best response for each bidder [22] . is proposed. At last, we analyze the formulated game and prove convergence of the proposed algorithm.
A. Utility functions
We first present the utility functions of APs and the PB, respectively.
1) The Utility Function of Each AP: Given the unit price of the PB's energy, denoted by µ, the payment from the ith AP can be written by
Therefore, with (6) and (25), the utility function of the ith AP can be defined as
2) The Utility Function of the PB:
T . Then, the utility of the PB can be expressed as
Note that, there is a reserve price for the PB, denoted by µ (0) . It is assumed that if the outcome price of an auction game is larger than µ (0) , the PB would benefit from the trade. Otherwise, it would not participate in the trade [24] , [25] .
B. Auction Game
Now, we are ready to formulate an auction game, where the APs are bidders and the PB is the auctioneer. Each AP submits bid to compete for the PB's energy, in order to maximize its utility defined in (26) . On the other hand, the PB aims to maximize its revenue in (27) by increasing its energy's unit price. In particular, the auctioneer first announces an initial price µ = µ (0) , and the bidders respond to the auctioneer with their optimal demands, i.e., the bids. Then, the auctioneer raises the price µ until the aggregate demands meet the total energy constraint, and meanwhile, the auctioneer concludes the auction and decides the final allocated energy to each bidder. i } i∈N by (32), sets µ (t+1) = µ (t) +∆, t = t+1, and repeats: a) The PB announces µ (t) to all APs. b) Given µ (t) , each AP updates its optimal bid E (t) i obtained by (29) . c) The PB sums up all bids that E (t) = i∈N E (t) i
and compares
, then the PB records the cumulative clinches {C (t) i } i∈N and sequentially sets µ (t+1) = µ (t) +∆, t = t+1. The auction continues. ii) Else, then by setting T = t, the PB concludes the auction and computes {C (T )
i } i∈N with (33) . Then, the PB allocates E i = C (T ) i to the ith AP.
In the formulated game, at each round t ≥ 0, with a given price µ (t) , the ith AP has an optimization problem as
We denote by τ
the optimal solution of (28). That is
Thus the bid of the ith AP is E (t) i given µ (t) . We also denote by E i and Γ i the final allocated energy and the final payment of the ith AP when the PB concludes the auction. With E i and Γ i , the utility of the ith AP in (26) becomes to
We then have an optimization problem regarding τ i as
We use τ i to denote the optimal solution to problem (31) , which is the optimal harvesting time of the ith source from its own AP. Analogue to the proof of Proposition 1, we can readily get τ i = τ i E i , where τ i (·) is given by (11) . Algorithm 2 elaborates the auction steps. Before starting the auction, the PB sets up the iteration index t = 0, the constant price step 7 ∆ > 0, and the initial price µ (0) . The price will be announced to all APs, and each AP will submit its optimal bid E (0) i based on the optimal response given by (29) . Then the PB sums up all bids that E (0) i∈N E (0) i , and compares
, then the PB ends the auction and quits the trade. Otherwise, the PB first computes a cumulative clinch [21] for each AP, which is the amount of the PB's energy that each AP is guaranteed to be allocated. The cumulative clinch for the ith AP at the round t ≥ 0 is given by
Then, the PB sets µ (t+1) = µ (t) + ∆, t = t + 1 and updates µ (t) to all APs. With the updated µ (t) , each AP submits its optimal bid
based on the optimal response τ (t)
i , E (t) i obtained by (29) . By comparing the aggregate bids E
, then the PB records the cumulative clinches {C (t) i } i∈N and sequentially sets µ
. By setting T = t, the PB concludes the auction and computes the cumulative clinches {C (T ) i } i∈N according to the proportional rationing rule (PRR) [39] by
is actually the finally allocated energy to the ith AP and it is a sum of its last energy bid and a proportion of the remaining energy
to the ith AP. With E i , the ith AP can decide its final harvesting time τ i . Hence, the utility of the ith AP can be expressed by
where the payment from the ith AP Γ i is given by
Notice that the term C (t)
in (35) is actually the amount of energy that the ith AP is guaranteed to be allocated with the announced price µ (t) . Their product will be the corresponding payment of the ith AP at the current round. By 7 Note that the constant step normally introduces errors to the convergence point [38] . However, this is not a problem for the considered auction mechanism with the proportional rationing rule (PRR) [39] given in (33) , which guarantees that the total energy of the PB can be entirely allocated at last. accumulating these payments generated at each round (from t = 0 to t = T ), we can have achieve total payment of the ith AP given in (35) . The utility of the PB thus is written by
C. Analysis of the Formulated Game
In this subsection, we analyze the formulated auction game. We first derive the optimal solution to problem (28) given in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Given a price µ (t) by the PB, the optimal solution to problem (28) can be expressed as is defined as the maximum acceptable price for the ith AP, which is equal to α i in (17) , z † i and γ i (·) are expressed in (13) and (23), respectively.
Proof : See Appendix D. Next, we prove that the proposed auction based distributed algorithm has the following convergence property. and when µ(t) approaches µ lim i , we can get
We denote by n the number of iterations when the proposed auction concludes. Recall that the price step is ∆. Thus
will decrease as µ (T ) increases. Therefore, there always exists an E (T ) that satisfies
such that the PB concludes the auction. Hence, the number of iterations n is finite, which completes this proof.
Last, we analyze the required signaling for the computations in the non-cooperative scenario. According to Algorithm 2, each AP first needs to measure the (equivalent) channel power gains G i and K i , and acquire the transmit power p b from the PB. The only value calculated by each AP and forwarded to the PB is the optimal bid E (t) i obtained by (37) . With all the bids from the APs, the PB announces the price µ (t) at the end of each iteration and the allocated energy the allocated energy E i at last to each AP. 
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to illustrate and compare the performance of both the proposed cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios. We denote by d AiSi and d P Si the distance between the ith source and its AP, and the distance between the ith source and the PB, respectively, ∀i ∈ N . We assume that all the channels experience quasi-static flat Rayleigh fading and adopt a distance-dependent pass loss model such as
] is the path-loss factor. Notice that a 30dB average signal power attenuation is assumed at a reference distance of 1m in the above channel model [12] . The system parameters used in the following simulations are listed in Table I .
The curves in Figs. 4-5 correspond to a network setup consisting of three AP-source pairs with one randomly generated channel realization, where the channel power gains between the APs and sources and the equivalent channel power gains between the PB and the sources are (17), (12) and (19) , respectively. Fig. 4 illustrates the convergence properties in the case E tot b
= 1Joule
8 for both the proposed water-filling based distributed algorithm in Algorithm 1 and the auction based distributed algorithm in Algorithm 2. It is shown in Fig. 4(a) that the value of ν starts from ν = max i∈N {α i } = α 1 = 5.6834, turns to ν = α 2 = 4.7802 and ν = α 3 = 0.4543. Then it is confirmed that ν exists between α 3 and α 2 . With the bisection method, the proposed water-filling based distributed 8 We consider T = 1s to guarantee the consistency of all physical units.
algorithm converges within few iterations and the desired ν is achieved. In Fig. 4(b) , with the increasing price µ (t) (as the iteration index t increases), the third AP-source pair first quits the auction when µ (t) ≥ µ lim 3
and its last bid is approximately equal to E lim 3 = 0.3299 (when the price step ∆ is sufficiently small). When the price µ (t) continues to rise, the bids of the first and the second AP-source pairs will decrease till the summation of the bids is smaller than E tot b . Then the PB concludes the auction, sets t = T and allocates the energy to each AP-source pair based on (33) , which validates the convergence of the proposed auction based i , which is due to the quitting of the PB in the adopted auction mechanism. Note that when µ (0) is sufficiently small, the energy payment of each AP to the PB can be ignored in its own utility function. In this case, the non-cooperative scenario can be approximated to the cooperative scenario. Thus, the optimal bid E 
. Therefore, the approach of E i to E o i and the plummeting of E i to zero occur almost simultaneously, as depicted in Fig. 5(a) . Fig. 5(b) shows the trends of both τ i and τ i versus E tot b . With the increasing of E tot b , the optimal DL WET time of the first AP-source pair first decreases and then increases while others remain the same. This is because the first AP-source pair is allocated energy first. When E tot b is small, the harvested energy for the source mainly comes from its associated AP, which corresponds to the case τ i > τ i (see Proposition 1) . But, with the assistance of the PB, the AP can shorten its DL WET time, which leads to the decrease of τ i (or τ i ). When E tot b continually increases, the source can harvest more energy from the PB, which corresponds to the case that the DL WET time is dominated by the PB, i.e., τ i = τ i (see Proposition 1) . In this case, the value of τ i (or τ i ) grows as the value of E tot b increases. Moreover, we can observe the same tendency of the second and the third AP-source pairs when they are allocated energy. When E tot i ≥ i∈N E o i , τ i of each AP-source pair in the cooperative scenario becomes constant as E i = E o i , almost at the same time, τ i for each AP-source pair in the non-cooperative scenario equals that in the case each source only harvests energy from its own AP, which is caused by the quitting of the PB. Now we show the average performance of both the proposed scenarios and each curve hereafter is averaged over 10 4 randomly generated channel realizations. Fig. 6 demonstrates the average allocated energy and average DL WET time for each AP-source pair versus E tot b in both the proposed cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios. is, the larger is the probability of E is sufficiently large due to the quitting of the PB. Fig. 5(b) . Besides, when the number of participating AP-source pairs rises, the turning point of the corresponding curve appears later. The reason is that the more AP-source pairs, the less energy allocated to each source from the PB. Then, a larger value of E tot b is needed to make the DL WET time at each source dominated by the PB. is large enough. This is because when E tot b ≥ i∈N E o i , as shown in Fig. 5(a) , the allocated energy to each source will be a constant value and independent of E tot b , which leads to the saturation of the social welfare performance. In the non-cooperative scenario, as E tot b increases, the average social welfare performance closely matches that in the cooperative scenario when E tot b is small, but then deteriorates due to the quitting of the PB when E tot b
≥ i∈N E (0) i . Notice that when E tot b = 0, i.e., without the PB, the average social welfare performance is always the worst.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigated the joint time and energy allocation of a power beacon (PB)-assisted wireless-powered communication network (WPCN) with multiple access point (AP)-source pairs and a PB. We consider both cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios corresponding to the situations whether the PB provides wireless charing service to each AP-source pair for free or not. Moreover, the social welfare was maximized in the proposed cooperative scenario and the respective utility of each AP and the PB was maximized in the non-cooperative scenario. The numerical results validated the convergence of both the proposed water-filling based and auction based distributed algorithms. It was demonstrated that the average social welfare of the cooperative scenario improves as either the number of participating AP-source pairs or the total energy of the PB increases, but saturates when the total energy of the PB is sufficiently large. Moreover, the average social welfare performance of the non-cooperative scenario closely matches that in the cooperative scenario when the total energy of the PB is small, but deteriorates when the total energy of the PB is sufficiently large, which is caused by the quitting of the PB in the adopted auction mechanism.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 To proceed, we first derive the second-order derivative of S i (τ i ) with respect to τ i . After some simplifications, we have
where A i = 
where z i = 1 + Aiτi+Bi 1−τi . Note that z i > 1 as A i > 0 and 0 < τ i < 1. With reference to [12] , f (z i ) = z i ln (z i ) − z i + 1 is strictly increasing when z i > 1 and f (1) = 0. We then can deduce that there exists a unique solution, denoted by z
